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International Human Rights And Family
Planning: A Modest Proposal
BARBARA STARK*
INTRODUCTION
This paper proposes that the U.S. begin to take a more positive role
in advancing international human rights by reaffirming its historic com-
mitment to international family planning efforts. Specifically, I suggest
that we rescind the Mexico City Policy ("MCP"),1 repeal the Helms
Amendment' and explicitly apply internationally accepted human rights
norms to our population program. While the repudiation of the MCP and
the Helms Amendment suggests a return to an earlier era in family plan-
ning, the focus on the human rights implications represents a substantial
departure from our former policy. This reflects both the growing interna-
tional sensitivity to human rights since the inception of that policy in the
early seventies, and our own reevaluation of the "population problem" in
the early eighties.3 Unlike Swift's scathing satire, this truly is a "modest
proposal." I do not suggest that complex family planning problems can be
solved by the availability of contraception, including abortion.4 But un-
* Visiting Assistant Professor and Coordinator, Legal Writing Program, Rutgers Law
School. B.A., Cornell University, 1973; J.D., New York University, 1976; L.L.M., Columbia
Law School, 1989.
1. The MCP terminated all U.S. aid to family planning services engaging in abortion
related activities or speech. See infra text accompanying notes 18-27.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1)(2)(Supp. V 1982). The Helms Amendment prohibits direct
funding of abortion through nongovermental organizations. See infra text accompanying
notes 14-15.
3. In the World Bank's 1984 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 155, a distinction is made
between "family planning programs [which] provide information and services to help people
achieve their own fertility objectives" and "population policy [which] involves explicit de-
mographic goals." In this paper, unless otherwise specified, "population policy" and "family
planning services" both refer to programs providing aid and services to individuals. Since a
discussion of policy regarding aggregate fertility is beyond the scope of this paper, there is
no need for separate terms here.
In any case, as suggested at text accompanying notes 104-11, infra, family planning
policy affects population, albeit indirectly. This is not a simple issue. As Donald Strauss,
former chair of Planned Parenthood Federation of America has observed, commenting on
the Chinese government's efforts to reduce its population growth rate and resultant disre-
gard of human rights: "One of the dilemmas of our times is to equate the near and poignant
human rights of individuals now alive with the distant and difficult to imagine rights of
those still to be born." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1989, letter to the editor by D. Strauss, at A28,
col.6.
4. Rather, I agree with John Ratcliffe, who has argued that " ... overpopulation and
underdevelopment . . . can most effectively be resolved through a combination of wide-
spread social advancement and availability of the full range of birth control methods.." Rat-
cliffe, The Reagan Population Policy: An Error of the Third Kind, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
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less such contraception is available, it is difficult to even begin to address
these issues.5
The utilization of human rights standards in this context is conced-
edly problematic. What are the human rights that would be promoted?
Are these rights recognized by the U.S.? What, if anything, is gained by
analyzing family planning issues in terms of human rights, rather than as
questions of public policy? I will argue that a rights analysis is essential
here for three basic reasons.' First, a clear focus on rights should help us
avoid the rights violations that have marred family planning programs in
the past. Second, the grave global problems of reproductive choice de-
mand a principled, universal approach. Third, it is important that these
issues are understood in terms of rights because the exercise of rights as
such by Third World women, who are most affected by U.S. family plan-
ning policy, may help them to begin to address other aspects of their op-
pression.7 The experience of exercising rights itself contributes to empow-
erment.' Family planning is a natural place to start because it involves
issues central to the Third World woman's daily life.
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I briefly de-
scribe the current U.S. position, its origins and consequences. In the sec-
ond part, I suggest that U.S. family planning support be structured and
evaluated in accordance with widely accepted international human rights
norms and pertinent domestic constitutional standards. From this, I de-
rive a "hybrid" rights formulation linking international notions of affirm-
ative rights with the American idea of reproductive choice as a fundamen-
tal right. In the last part, I analyze the possible impact of the hybrid
POL. 267, 298 (1987).
5. See Farley & Tokarski, Legal Restrictions on the Distribution of Contraceptives in
the Developing Nations: Some Suggestions for Determining Priorities and Estimating Im-
pact of Change, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 418 (1974-75) (significant numbers of
people in developing countries have decided to limit family size but cannot do so because
contraceptives are either physically or economically unavailable to them); R. REPETTO,
WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 43
(1986)(most households in Third World countries where birth and death rates are high do
not have access to family planning services); Johnson-Acsadi, The Scale of the Problem, 15
PEOPLE 3 (1988) ("Among 22 developing countries, from 13-51% of women aged 15-49 re-
ported having had an unwanted pregnancy or live birth in the two years before the survey
took place .... ").
6. See generally Symposium: The Civil Liberties and Human Rights Implications of
United States International Population Policy, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1987);
Rights of Choice in Matters Relating to Human Reproduction: Part I of a Symposium on
Law and Population, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 273 (1974-75).
7. See generally G. LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, 233-35 (1986) (comparing
the terms "oppression" and "subordination" of women).
8. See Lefort, Politics and Human Rights, in POLITICAL FORMS IN MODERN SOCIETY
(M.I.T. 1986) (arguing that awareness and assertion of rights as rights are a crucial part of a
trans- formative political process). Third World women are among the most oppressed peo-
ple on earth. See Hosken, Toward a Definition of Women's Human Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. Q.
1, 2 (1981).
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formulation on some specific human rights.' These include the rights to
reproductive choice, equality, health and an "adequate" standard of
living.
I. BACKGROUND
A. U.S. Support for International Family Planning
A brief history background of U.S. participation in international pop-
ulation planning efforts may be useful in evaluating the political feasibil-
ity of the proposal for a revised U.S. role.1" Even the most perfunctory
review shows not only that until very recently the U.S. actively supported
international family planning, but that dramatic shifts in policy in this
area have been - and can be - implemented in a relatively short period
of time.
The U.S. has supported international family planning services for
more than twenty-five years. In 1961, AID (Agency for International De-
velopment) was established to coordinate U.S economic and humanita-
rian aid programs. 1 In 1967, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was
amended by the passage of Title X. This authorized broad population
planning support, including the construction of family planning clinics
and funding for research programs. AID funding was increased from $4.4
million to $34.8 million.1 2
In 1973 the U.S. shifted the emphasis of its foreign aid program from
large to small scale projects. Family planning was a keystone of this "New
Directions" strategy, reflecting the general consensus among policymakers
that Third World countries "could not effectively address pressing social
and economic problems until modern methods of contraception were in-
troduced on a mass scale."1 "
In the same year, the senate passed the Helms Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act." The Helms Amendment prohibits direct fund-
ing of abortion through nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") 5 As a
practical matter, such direct funding had never comprised a significant
proportion of AID and was easily channeled elsewhere. Thus, the direct
impact of the Helms Amendment on international population programs
9. Cf. Price-Cohen, International Fora for the Vindication of Human Rights Violated
by the U.S. International Population Policy, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.& POL. 241, 248 (1987)
(noting the analytic problems of demonstrating that existing policies violate human rights).
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the program, see Fox, American
Population Policy Abroad: The Mexico City Abortion Funding Restrictions, 18 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 609, 611 (1986).
11. Fox, supra note 10, at 611.
12. Id. at 614.
13. Id. at 611.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1)(2) (Supp. V 1982).
15. The constitutionality of the Helms Amendment has generally been conceded. Com-
ment, International Family Planning, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 155, 170 (1985) [hereinafter
"Houston Comment"].
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was not great. Support for other forms of family planning remained high.
The U.S. had supported the International Planned Parenthood Fed-
eration ("IPPF") since 1968 and U.S. contributions constituted almost
25% of the IPPF's budget for 1984.6 In 1986, the U.S. was the largest
single contributor to U.N. sponsored family planning programs. 7 AID
was the single greatest source of funding for overseas family planning.
B. The Mexico City Policy ("MCP")
In August, 1984, the U.N. Population Conference in Mexico City was
convened to reevaluate the World Population Plan of Action adopted in
1974.1 The Reagan administration viewed the Mexico City Conference as
an opportunity to demonstrate its vehement opposition to abortion to the
world, as well as its right wing constituency. 9 Promulgation of the MCP
unequivocally showed that undermining support for international family
planning had become a high priority of the Administration." The MCP
effectively extended the application of the Helms Amendment far beyond
that which had been contemplated by the Senate. This was accomplished
by the imposition of two additional conditions. First, foreign recipients
were forbidden to engage in any abortion related activities or speech. Sec-
ond, they were prohibited from doing so regardless of the funding source
of such activities.
2 '
This policy has had profound consequences for both the population
planning NGOs and those they serve.22 As Sharon Camp points out, the
MCP jeopardized over 120 family planning projects worth almost $23 mil-
lion annually." The maneuvers required to remain eligible for funds dis-
16. Camp, The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Women and Health Care in De-
veloping Countries, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 37 (1987).
17. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., No. 88-5243 (D. Cal. Oct. 10,
1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Fox, supra note 10, at 628. For a description of the World Population Conference in
Bucharest in 1974, see B. HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107-10 (1987).
19. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 123-25; see also Fox, supra note 10, at 633
(noting that the MCP was "met with hostility" from most [Third World] delegates). See
generally Cook & Dickens, International Developments in Abortion Laws: 1977-78, AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1305, 1310 (1988) ("The prevailing U.S. initiative [as
expressed in the MCP] runs counter to the evolving trend of
worldwide abortion reform.")
20. The MCP has been criticized as a cynical political capitulation to the efforts of an
activist minority, including substantial support from organized religion. See B. HARTMANN,
supra note 18, at 244. For an incisive analysis of the role of the Catholic church in the
formulation of family planning policy, see Benshoof, The Establishment Clause and Gov-
ernment-Funded Natural Family Planning Programs: Is the Constitution Dancing to a
New Rhythm? 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1987).
21. U.S. Population Policy as Announced in Mexico City, 1984: A Background State-
ment Prepared by the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project 3 [hereinafter "ACLU
Statement"].
22. Id.
23. Camp, supra note 16, at 50. IPPF/WHR received a $27 million extension of a
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rupted the population establishment. IPPF, for example, initially took a
unified approach, refusing to require its 117 member associations to stop
all abortion activities. In 1985, however, the Western Hemisphere Region
section of IPPF agreed to AID's restrictions, thus undermining Planned
Parenthood Federation of America's efforts to reverse them.2
According to the Population Crisis Committee ("PCC"), which un-
dertook a study of the effects of the MCP in 1987, most of the agencies
questioned were not yet operating under the anti-abortion restrictions.
Those organizations which had implemented the MCP standards re-
ported that they had: (1) incurred substantial increases in administrative
costs (in connection with monitoring their subgrantees);(2) avoided cer-
tain countries and categories of foreign organization;(3) phased out re-
search on the consequences of illegal abortions;(4) disassociated them-
selves from medical research that might be considered abortion-
related;(5) were generally "chilled" in their provision of services, and (6)
inadvertently violated the MCP.25 As Camp observes:
In the end, however, the most pervasive and devastating effect of the
policy will be felt by women in developing nations who rely on the
integrity of the health professionals funded by the U.S. government.
By depriving those women of all information about the availability
and advisability of abortion, the [MCP] inevitably will prevent women
from obtaining medically necessary abortions and will cause women to
bear children at great risks to their physical health."2
As this capsule history suggests, the risks and uncertainties to which
the vagaries of our political system subject recipient states and NGOs is a
very real problem. By its nature, the success of family planning depends
on continuity.2 7 Just as the community must be able to rely on the pro-
grams, they in turn must be able to count on their funding sources. This
is an important reason for protecting such decisions from executive ca-
price. As I will argue in the next part of this article, one way to do so may
be by giving such aid the status of rights.
C. "Overpopulation" or underdevelopment?
While deploring the anti-abortion focus of the MCP, Betsy Hart-
mann has observed that it raised important questions about the underly-
ing premises of the Western population establishment. Moreover, it re-
flected a new recognition of the critical role of development in population
programs.
Matching Grant from AID. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT IPPF/WHR 13.
24. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 114.
25. Camp, supra note 16, at 41-48.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Farley & Tokarski, supra note 5, at 439. See Crossette, Why India is Still Failing
to Stop Its Population Surge, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 4, at 2, col 1 (Indian experts
attribute large families, in part, to "a dearth of sustained information and follow-up
services.").
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There are basically two views of population growth. One, as epito-
mized by the World Bank's Report on Population 1984,28 may be referred
to as the "population explosion" view.29 Its adherents argue that over-
population, resulting in intense competition for scarce resources, is a pri-
mary cause of poverty and starvation. They believe that the sheer num-
ber of human beings and the rate at which they are reproducing amounts
to a global crisis.
The other view, which I will call the "development view," considers
the high fertility rate that leads to burgeoning population more a symp-
tom than a cause of poverty. As Hartmann explains, having many chil-
dren is sensible and rational in an agrarian society dependent on child
labor. Moreover, the lack of pensions or social security programs means
that children are the only insurance for a couple's old age. High infant
mortality makes it necessary to have many children in order to be sure
that some will survive to adulthood. Finally, from the development view,
the issue of the demand on global resources by an expanding Third World
population is specious since we in the West still consume far more than
they do, by any logical measure, because our per capita consumption is so
high. 0 Thus, the argument continues, "population explosion" is the ra-
cist, elitist rallying cry of a West in fear of being overrun by dark
hordes." Population control, according to proponents of the development
view, requires both freely available family planning services and a more
equitable distribution of wealth. Compelling statistics demonstrate that
the correlation between lowered fertility and development depends more
on the equitable distribution of resources than the GNP per capita.2
Where individual families benefit economically from development, they
are apt to have fewer children.
The drafters of the MCP, while rejecting the economic analysis of the
development view, denied that population growth presents a significant
problem. Even if growth were undesirable, they argued, the correlation
between increased industrialization and declining birthrate" indicates
that the best way to deal with it is through economic development. The
Reagan administration concluded that a vigorous free market economy
was the best way to stimulate development, which it assumed would lead
to lower birth rates. Even if this is so, as the World Bank has tersely
observed, "many developing countries cannot afford to wait for fertility to
28. Houston Comment, supra note 15, at 156. See, e.g., Ratcliffe, supra note 4, at 267
n.1.
29. See P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
30. OUR COMMON FUTURE: WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT 95 (1987) [hereinafter "Our Common Future"]. Close to 25% of the world's
inhabitants consume less than five percent of the world's output; a similar percentage in the
industrialized countries consume more than two-thirds. See R. REPETTO, supra note 5, at 42.
31. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 95-98 (discussing the confluence of the eugen-
ics and birth control movements).
32. Id. at 273; Our Common Future, supra note 30, at 106.
33. Houston Comment, supra note 15, at 172.
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decline spontaneously" 4 in response to projected economic development.
Both the development and the population explosion views may have
human rights repercussions. To the extent the population explosion anal-
ysis is used to justify the abrogation of the individual's reproductive
choice on the grounds of national necessity, it violates a human rights
approach to family planning. To the extent that the development ap-
proach incorporates the neo-Malthusian view that population is self-regu-
lating, through high mortality or natural family planning, it too becomes
a mechanism for curtailing reproductive choice.
II. STANDARDS
Both the affirmative economic, social and cultural rights set forth in
the international instruments and the fundamental privacy rights assured
by the U.S. constitution are necessary to solve the problems of population
policy. Neither approach is sufficient in itself in the international family
planning context. Indeed, as I will show in this section, their inadequacies
complement each other. This suggests the need for a "hybrid" formula-
tion, a selective blend of the two rights traditions, in which the affirma-
tive rights of the international instruments are qualified by the American
notion of fundamental privacy rights, which they simultaneously expand.
In developing this synthesis, this part of the paper attempts to provide a
workable example of the constructive interplay of American and interna-
tional conceptions of rights.
A. International Instruments
There are .at least two basic reasons for considering questions of in-
ternational family planning in terms of human rights, as these rights have
been interpreted in the international human rights instruments. First, by
utilizing these terms, we place these issues squarely in the context of in-
ternationally accepted norms. This clarifies and narrows the debate. Sec-
ond, by recognizing the rights consequences of these policy decisions, we
acknowledge and articulate the constitutive principles to which law, pol-
icy and even presidents must conform. If the U.S. is serious about human
rights, and expects to be taken seriously by the rest of the world, we must
consider the human rights implications of our policies. The following in-
ternational treaties provide widely accepted and clearly articulated stan-
dards pertinent here: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ( "Civil Covenant"), the International Covenant on Social, Eco-
nomic and Cultural Rights ("Economic Covenant") and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (
"Women's Convention"). 5
34. Id. at 162.
35. G.A. Res. 180 (XXXIV 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), adopted by the
General Assembly on Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981. See generally Cook,
The International Right of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex - A. Bibliography, 14
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We should adopt the norms established in these instruments as
guidelines for the formulation of American international family planning
policy for several reasons.3 6 First, they provide an invaluable indication of
the priorities and values held by most of the international community,37
including the high priority given economic rights in the Third World. By
demonstrating our commitment to these globally accepted principles,3 8 we
show good faith and thereby enhance our credibility. Other states would
probably be more receptive to our criticism if we were more open to
theirs. 9 Thus, we should adhere to these norms, unless they clearly con-
flict with our own principles,"0 because they express a global consensus
against which the rest of the world will judge our actions."'
Second, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
imposes a special obligation with respect to treaties we have signed: "A
state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty [which] . . . it has signed. . . until it shall have made
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. . . ,,,2 The Eco-
nomic and Civil Covenants as well as the Women's Convention were
among those signed by President Carter.43
YALE J. INT'L L. 161 (1989); Byrnes, The 'Other' Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1989); Heller, International Convention on Women's Rights: Bringing About Ratification
in the United States, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 431 (1987).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98 (applicable norms under the Civil Cove-
nant, and notes 111-12 (applicable norms under the Economic Covenant infra). Cf. Coliver
& Newman, Using International Human Rights Law to Influence Population Policy: Re-
sort to Courts or Congress?, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53, 84 (1987) (discussing the
derivation of "judicially manageable standards" from international law in this context).
37. See generally L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978); J. NICKELS, MAKING
SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1987). But cf. Galey, International Enforcement of Women's Rights, 6
HUM. RTS. Q. 463 (1984) (problems of enforcement of women's rights, and prospects for
improvement).
38. See generally Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
39. "We should not give the impression that we are mainly interested in enforcing
human rights elsewhere while avoiding any change in our own law or practice." SENATE
COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT, S. REP.
No. 381-14.2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"] (Prepared
Statement of Professor Oscar Schachter). But cf. Schachter, International Law Implica-
tions of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 73 (1978) (General right of
censure should not be limited to those states which are parties to the international rights
instruments).
40. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 71-78 (discussing the abortion of female fetuses).
41. See generally, HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 981-83 (1987) [hereinafter "International Law"]; Humphrey, The Implementa-
tion of International Human Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31 (1978).
42. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27 at 17 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 686
(1969); accord 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 312, at 173 (1987) [hereinafter "Third Restatement"].
43. President Carter Signs Covenants on Human Rights, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Oct. 31,
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The right to abortion, however, is conspicuous by its absence from
the international instruments."" As Joan Fitzpatrick Hartman has pointed
out:
None of the human rights instruments contain an explicit right of per-
sonal choice for women seeking to terminate their pregnancies. In the
only international case directly confronting access to abortion as a pri-
vacy right, the European Commission on Human Rights did not find a
choice of pregnancy termination within the right to privacy and fam-
ily protection under the European Convention. 6
The failure of these instruments to recognize a woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy may be attributed to several factors, including the
prevalence of patriarchy46 and the political influence of religions such as
fundamental Islam 7 and Catholicism, which are opposed to abortion.
Under local law, for example, abortion is illegal or permitted only where
the woman's life is at stake in most of the Muslim countries of Asia, two-
thirds of the Latin American countries and much of Africa. 48 As I will
explain in the next section, the extent to which local laws conflict with
rights well established in our jurisprudence, like a woman's right to
choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, should be considered by
the U.S. in allocating assistance.
B. Domestic Standards
The right to use contraception, including abortion, is predicated on
privacy rights which have been found to be fundamental by the U.S. Su-
1977, at 586; Message from the President to the Senate transmitting the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Nov. 12, 1980).
44. One of the most creative approaches to this void has been devised by Coliver &
Newman, who note that the cited instruments set forth general principles - including the
right to health and the right of women to attain access to family planning - which may
impose a duty on governments, as a matter of customary international law, to refrain from
defunding NGOs when doing so is likely to "seriously threaten the health of a significant
number of people," Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 68-70. They concede, however,
that, "Several instruments recognize interests that compete with a mother's interest in free
choice," id. at 67 (citing American Convention on Human Rights, art. IV, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970); art. 18 of the Civil Covenant.
45. See Hartman, The Impact of the Reagan Administration's International Popula-
tion Policy on Human Rights Relating to Health and the Family, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 169, 177 (1987) (citing Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10
EUR. COMM'N H.R. 100 (1978)).
46. See generally Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory for Action, 9
HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987) (historical overview of human rights and women's rights move-
ments, urging a unified approach).
47. See generally An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Mus-
lim Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987).
48. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 245 (citing C. TIETZE, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD
REVIEW, 1983. Indeed, if reproductive choice had been explicitly assured in the covenants, it
is questionable whether they would have been as widely ratified in the Third World. At the
very least, reservations probably would have been taken with respect to that right.
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preme Court. In Griswold v. Connecticut,49 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state law that criminalized the use of contraceptives for married
persons. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,50 the protection was extended to single
persons: "If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."61 In Roe v. Wade,52 the Court expressly
found that the privacy right was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 3 In Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services," the Supreme Court declined to overrule
Roe, holding that the state could refuse to allow the use of facilities for
abortions as long as it "places no obstacle - absolute or otherwise - in
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.)5 5 As Justice Blackmun notes
in his dissent, the Court does not make a "single, even incremental,
change in the law of abortion . . ... 5 Rather, the Webster Court simply
persists in the fallacious distinction between a government imposed "ob-
stacle" and indigency, for which the government is not responsible, but
which may effectively preclude abortion.
While I agree with Justice Blackmun that the pluralility "obscures
the portent" of the decision, and that Webster is likely to have dire con-
sequences at home,5" the decision does not detract from the analysis here.
Rather, I am concerned with precisely those obstacles decried by the
Webster court; i.e., obstacles "placed in the path of women seeking abor-
tions" by government. In the context of international family planning, I
urge that the U.S. both avoid creating such obstacles and carefully con-
sider those erected by recipient states.
The other element of the hybrid proposal, i.e., an affirmative eco-
nomic obligation, is found not in domestic law, but in the international
instruments discussed above. The U.S has never found any constitutional
obligation on the part of the state to provide contraception or to fund
abortions. In Harris v. McRae,5" the Supreme Court held that there was
no constitutional entitlement to medicaid funding for abortions even if
poor women could not otherwise obtain them. Although a compelling ar-
49. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Eisenstatd v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51. Id. at 453.
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 155 (1973).
53. Id. at 153.
54. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 106 L.Ed. 2d 410 (1989); See generally
Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Narrowing Roe v. Wade, Upholds Sharp State Limits on
Abortions, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
55. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d at 429, citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
56. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d, at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. "I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women
who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided. I fear for the integ-
rity of, and public esteem for, this Court." Id. at 449.
58. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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gument may be made that McRae represents a fundamental restriction of
the right to choose an abortion, on its own terms it is less about limiting
the right to choose than it is about the Supreme Court's refusal to recog-
nize affirmative economic rights:
To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due
Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require
Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent
woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to sub-
sidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process
Clause supports such an extraordinary result. Whether freedom of
choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization
is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional
entitlement. 9
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to accord any economic
rights constitutional status.8 Thus, it is not surprising that the courts
have for the most part rejected the argument that the MCP violates the
U.S. constitution. 1 If the affirmative economic rights established in the
international instruments are recognized and applied in the context of
U.S. international family planning programs, however, abortion may well
be an entitlement" 2- at least in those countries where a woman may
choose to terminate her pregnancy without state interference.
C. A Hybrid Formulation
1. Towards a Constructive Synthesis
The international instruments do not recognize women's fundamen-
tal right to choose whether or not to terminate pregnancy, a right firmly
established under the U.S. constitution." The U.S. constitution, on the
59. Id. at 318.
60. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). As Henkin has observed, our emergence
in the twentieth century as what some characterize as a welfare state has been accomplished
despite the constitution, rather than because of it. L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 128.
61. See, e.g., Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 77-83; Planned Parenthood Fed'n v.
Agency for Int'l Dev., 670 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on these grounds, aff'd on
other grounds, 838 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (on remand, oral argument was scheduled for
July 21, 1989, on defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted); telephone interview with Roger Evans, Esq., counsel for plaintiff on June
9, 1989. See also DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 630 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C.
1986), 810 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1987).
62. This would probably not be an absolute right under any of the international con-
ventions, which take a pragmatic approach to economic rights. Under Art. 2.1 of the Eco-
nomic Covenant, for example, a state is required "to take steps ... to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." In any case, for purposes of this paper I am assuming
voluntary U.S. accession to international norms, rather than the imposition of any enforcea-
ble duty against the U.S. But cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 91 (statement of Pro-
fessor Louis Sohn, explaining that this language is "obligatory... [creating] a legal duty to
take such steps, and this duty needs to be fulfilled in good faith").
63. But see, e.g., Greenhouse, Battle Over; Now, a War: Three New Cases Will Put
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other hand, fails to address the economic, social, and cultural circum-
stances which may well render the enjoyment of that right nugatory.
Thus, I suggest a "hybrid" approach to international family planning,
combining the affirmative rights described in the international covenants
with the fundamental right to reproductive choice guaranteed under the
U.S. constitution. Under such a hybrid rights formulation, U.S. funded
family planning programs would treat reproductive choice, including
abortion, as a fundamental right and would also recognize the affirmative
economic, social and cultural rights of the individual program
participants.64
This is not the same obligation that the U.S. would assume by adher-
ing to the international covenants. While ratification of the covenants
might give rise to an inchoate right to development under Art. 2(1) of the
Economic Covenant,65 it would not necessarily require us to further the
affirmative rights of citizens of other countries. Under the conventions,
affirmative rights are to be provided by the individuals' own state. In ad-
dressing those rights, the U.S. would be contributing to the state's efforts
to further the rights of its own people.66
U.S. recognition of reproductive choice and affirmative rights means
that the U.S. would not only refrain from imposing any constraints on
family planning program participants which would interfere with their
enjoyment of such rights, but also that the U.S. would evaluate family
planning programs in terms of their rights consequences. A rights analysis
would provide the basic framework in which the U.S. operated and as-
sessed its family planning programs, subject to the pre-existing law of the
local state.6
Supreme Court on a Collision Course with Roe v. Wade, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989 at 1, col.
4; Fein, "The Court is Ready to Overturn 'Roe' ", See id. at A21, col.1; c[ Gross, Goaded by
Ruling, Groups Plot State-by-State Plan to Keep Abortion Rights, see id. at A17, col. 1.
64. This would encourage, although it would not assure, the "extraordinary result" con-
templated by the McRae Court; i.e., an "affirmative funding obligation" with regard to abor-
tion notwithstanding the absence of specific legislation. See generally HALBERSTAM &
DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS, AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA?
(1987) (comparing women's rights under U.S. law with women's rights under the interna-
tional covenants).
65. See SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 331- 32 (1985); DRAFT
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/40/277 (1985).
66. The vast majority of Third World U.N. member states have adhered to the cove-
nants. See supra note 41, at 994. Even if the recipient state had not adhered to the cove-
nants, however, under this proposal the U.S. would refer to the standards established in
those instruments because of the global acceptance of these standards (see infra text accom-
panying notes 37-41) and because of their concrete importance to the Third World, espe-
cially Third World women. (See infra text accompanying notes 95-128.).
67. For tables showing circumstances under which abortion is permitted worldwide, see
"Regional Developmemts in Abortion Laws: 1967-1988" (chart referencing countries that
have changed abortion law since 1968, available from IPPF); C. TIETZE & S.K. HENSHAW,
INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD VIEW (6th ed. 1986); Cook & Dickens, supra note 19, at 1306-
307 (chart showing "Legislative Developments in Indications for Abortion: 1977-1988")
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U.S. recognition of these rights would not, of course, affect their sta-
tus under local law. If local law imposed intolerable constraints on rights,
however, the program could be terminated. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to define "tolerable" rights parameters, which would probably have
to be determined on a fact-specific, case by case basis. Local law punish-
ing parents for having more than one child, for example, would probably
be fatal to a program under a hybrid rights framework, as would the dis-
tribution of contraceptives posing a significant health risk. A strong argu-
ment could be made that a local bar on abortion would similarly so con-
travene basic rights as to mandate defunding by the U.S.."' This
contention would probably not prevail, however, in view of the historic
U.S. support of family planning programs which have not included abor-
tion and the practical consequences of terminating such programs.
There is no constitutional impediment to the synthesis urged, no
constitutional proscription against a more expansive construction of the
right to choose. Indeed, thirteen states currently pay for abortions with
state Medicaid funds."9 The adoption of affirmative economic rights,
while resisted as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, may be palat-
able in the limited context of international family planning for several
reasons.7 0 First, the political considerations underlying Congress' decision
not to fund abortions at home may no longer be applicable abroad.71 Pub-
lic policy justifications for supporting family planning programs, includ-
ing those offering abortion, may be more compelling in an international
than in a domestic context. It may be particularly crucial for a woman to
have the option of terminating her pregnancy where access to effective
forms of contraception may be limited, where the health risks associated
with pregnancy and childbirth are great, and where the mother will al-
most invariably assume primary responsibility for the infant. 2 Abortion
68. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d 410 (affirming that Texas statute in Roe v. Wade criminaliz-
ing all abortions, except where women's life was at stake, was unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause).
69. As of June 25, 1989, thirteen states paid for abortions without restrictions with
state Medicaid funds: Alaska, California,Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia and Vermont.
Four additional states will pay for abortions in cases of rape, incest or to save the woman's
life. All of the remaining states will pay for abortions to save the woman's life. Where Abor-
tion Laws Stand Now, State by State, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, at 20, col.4.
70. Affirmative economic rights are increasingly acceptable. As Professor Henkin has
noted, "[Is] it not the case that people today have recognized and ordained that it is among
the purposes of government to ensure every inhabitant - as of right, not by grace and
charity - [receives] the basic human needs (food, shelter, health care, education) when the
individual cannot provide them?" Henkin, The United States Constitution as Social Com-
pact, 131 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 261 (1987).
71. See supra note 20. Indeed, Congress recently voted funds for rape and incest vic-
tims, although it was unable to override President Bush's veto. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at
Al. See also Wicker, A President's Beholden, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1989, at A25, criticizing
President Bush's veto of renewal of aid to the U.N. Population Fund for family planning
services explicitly excluding abortion.
72. Cf. M. GLENDON, DIVORCE AND ABORTION IN WESTERN LAW 53-57 (1987) (describing
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funding in the Third World may further be warranted by intolerably high
infant and maternal mortality rates7" and widespread destitution contrib-
uting to human misery on a scale inconceivable in this country.7 '
This contextual approach to population issues finds support in Mary
Ann Glendon's comparative study of abortion in western Europe and the
U.S.. 75 In her book, Professor Glendon compares the abortion laws of
eighteen western European countries, the U.S. and Canada. She finds
that most countries permit abortion for "cause," such as serious danger to
the women's health, likelihood of serious disease or defect in the fetus,
76
or a "variety of circumstances which pose exceptional hardship for the
pregnant woman.
77
As Professor Glendon points out, these findings parallel American
public opinion polls over an extended period of time.7 s A recent poll again
shows that support for the woman's right to choose abortion depends on
the reason suggested for her decision. Eighty-seven percent of those
polled thought a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if her
health was seriously endangered by the pregnancy, while only twenty-six
percent thought abortion should be available if the pregnancy interfered
with work or education. 79 From a public policy perspective, Congress may
be more willing to finance family planning, including abortion, abroad
than at home because of the well-documented health risks associated with
repeated pregnancies among women in the Third World. Even when the
notion of entitlement was far less widely accepted than it is today, liberal
theorists argued that society had some duty to those who would be other-
wise unable to survive."'
social services and financial support provided in Europe for mothers and infants); see also
L. NSIAH-JEFFERSON, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color and Low Income Women in RE-
PRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989).
73. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, Sex Discrimination and Principles of Equality
Under International Law 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1987) (quoting Dr. Hafdan Mah-
ler's speech inwhich he noted that "[The developing] countries commonly have maternal
mortality rates 200 times higher than those of Europe and North America - the widest
disparity in all statistics of public health". Id. at 93).
74. I am assuming that the aggregate impact of these factors could be legitimately
taken into account by Congress for purposes of supporting family planning services; i.e.,
services that assist individual women in avoiding or terminating a pregnancy. This is not to
imply that such factors justify U.S. accession to foreign demographic goals.
75. M. GLENDON, supra note 72.
76. These are among what she characterizes as "hard grounds," which also include
pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. Id. at 14.
77. Professor Glendon calls these "soft grounds." Id. at 14.
78. Id. at 41.
79. Dionne, Poll on Abortion Finds the Nation is Sharply Divided, N.Y.Times, Apr.
26, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
80. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: A CRITICAL EDITION WITH AN INTRO-
DUCTION AND APPARATUS CRITICUS § 43, at 189 (P. Laslitt ed. 1967); J.S. MILL, The Province
of Government from PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Book V, Chap. XI (1871), reprinted
in HELD, PROPERTY, PROFITS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 178, 182 (1980). See also R. HOF-
STADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 340 (1948) ("The
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2. Conflicts Between International and Domestic Norms
Under the U.S. Constitution, abortion may be elective until fetal via-
bility. The state cannot inquire into the woman's motive for abortion. In
the Third World, however, the overwhelming preference for male children
raises the question of "discriminatory" abortion. In India and China, for
example, abortion has been used to select the sex of the infant.8 The
routine abortion of female fetuses arguably violates the Women's Conven-
tion, which requires party states to:
[T]ake all appropriate measures . . . [t]o modify the social and cul-
tural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes. 82
There appears to be a conflict between the two standards.
In ratifying treaties, it is well settled that the U.S. shall not bind
itself with regard to provisions of dubious constitutionality.8" While the
treaty may be ratified, the U.S. will typically take reservations with re-
spect to such provisions.8 4 A similar approach could be adopted in deter-
mining which standard to apply here. One alternative would be to disre-
gard the Women's Convention insofar as it conflicts with the right
articulated in Roe v. Wade.85 Thus, abortions for purposes of sex selection
would not be challenged. After all, in the U.S. there is no legal proscrip-
tion against such abortions. In the U.S., however, there is no widespread
female infanticide. Nor is the perception that girls are worth less than
boys so prevalent.88
Perhaps the value of the international standards can best be appreci-
ated in addressing this kind of situation, which is basically without analog
in our society. Although Americans would presumably be offended by
abortion to choose the sex of the child, individual decisions to do so (as
opposed to legislative requirements) would probably not violate our Con-
stitution. Sex selection as a "'cleaner' method of female infanticide
87
New Deal established the principle that the entire community through the agency of the
federal government had some responsibility for mass welfare."); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUS-
TICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 267 (1980).
81. B. HARTMANN, supra note 15, at 247; see also McNamara, The Population Problem:
Time Bomb or Myth, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1107 (Summer 1984) (discussing abortion of female
fetuses in response to coercive birth control programs in China).
82. Art. 5(2), Women's Convention, supra note 35.
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 42, § 302, at 155; Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1
(1957).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 42, §§ 313-14, at 179-89.
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. This perception, of course, is not unknown in the West. See, e.g., G. Rubin, The
Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY
OF WOMEN 160 (1975).
87. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 248.
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may well be barred, on the other hand, by the above-cited provision of
the Women's Convention, which mandates the "elimination . . .of prac-
tices . . based on the idea . . of inferiority [of females]."" s The
Women's Convention provides a jurisprudential structure for our objec-
tions, enabling us to distinguish them from mere cultural bias and to
grapple with the issue in a principled manner. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to attempt to resolve this dilemma,"' the problem il-
lustrates the indispensability of international norms in the formulation of
international family planning policy.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCED
This part focuses on the possible impact of the hybrid formulation on
three significant human rights,9" first describing the right and then dis-
cussing the ways in which it would be affected by the approach described
in the preceding section. The three rights considered are: the right of re-
productive choice for women; women's right to equality; and the right to
health and an adequate standard of living. The first right is grounded
most firmly in the U.S. constitution, the second is reflected in both U.S.
constitutional and international jurisprudence and the third is found only
in the international instruments. Analyzing these specific rights, accord-
ingly, should enable us to consider the interplay of the domestic and in-
ternational standards along a continuum, providing some perspective on
the extent to which the hybrid formulation would both further and com-
promise the two conceptions of rights. Ideally, by addressing the needs
and concerns of recipient states, family planning assistance could gener-
ate international goodwill as well as furthering the specific rights ad-
dressed. By fostering mutual respect between nations, such aid could con-
tribute to an international environment more conducive to the exercise of
all human rights.9 This kind of productive relationship may be particu-
larly difficult to cultivate in this context because of the clash between
Western and Third World views as to the position of women in society.2
88. Art. 5(a), Women's Convention, supra note 35.
89. One possible response might be to decline to fund genetic screening for sex, except
where justified by a suspected sex-linked defect. In China, for example, a procedure was
developed for determining the sex of the fetus at seven weeks. The procedure was discontin-
ued after twenty-nine of the first thirty women who chose to have abortions aborted female
fetuses. Hartmann, supra note 18, at 247. Similarly problematic, information about the fe-
tus' sex could be withhel.
90. For discussions of addditional rights which would be advanced by revocation of the
MCP, see Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 82 (right to receive and impart abortion
information); id. at 124 (discrimination against children). See generally Eisler, supra note
46.
91. See Eisler, supra note 46.
92. Indeed, this may become an imbroglio because of Third World distrust of Western
motives. During the 1970's, the population policy of the U.S. was decried by many states in
the Third World as "genocide." Ironically, some of the same Third World countries subse-
quently adopted even more stringent methods of population control. Moreover, American
renunciation of its family planning policy, as set forth in the MCP, was for the most part
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As suggested below, the generally higher status of women in the West9"
may be attributed in part to the degree of reproductive choice which they
already enjoy.
This part is divided into two sections. The first considers civil and
political rights and the second focuses on economic and social rights."'
A. Civil and Political Rights
1. Reproductive choice
The first civil right furthered by the hybrid formulation would be the
right to reproductive choice. While this right is firmly established in
American jurisprudence, its place in international law is more ambiguous.
The Civil Covenant provides that: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home,"" and,
"[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such inter-
ference or attacks.""0 Furthermore, "[t]he right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized."97
There is neither a right to abortion nor a prohibition against it under
international law.98 But at least in those states which recognize a woman's
right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, it should not be
abrogated solely because a state lacks the resources to implement it if
U.S. family planning assistance is available.
In considering how this right would be affected by the hybrid formu-
lation, I will address two questions. First, what difference does it make
whether reproductive choice is considered a right or a policy? Second,
assuming it is a right, whose right is it?
a. Reproductive choice - right or policy?
It is far more advantageous for women seeking to exercise reproduc-
tive choice if such choice is protected as a right, especially a "fundamen-
tal" right under the U.S. constitution, rather than provided as a matter of
public policy. First, state curtailment of a fundamental right is rigorously
scrutinized. Under the hybrid proposal here, this would mean that the
opposed by Third World delegates at the Mexico City conference. See supra note 19.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 89-95. See generally WOMEN IN THE WORLD
1975-1985: THE WOMEN'S DECADE (L. Iglitzion & R. Ross, 2d ed. 1986).
94. This reflects the respective concerns of the Civil and the Economic Covenants, al-
though the division is not precise here and other international instruments will also be
discussed.
95. Art. 17.1, accord Art. 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III
1948).
96. Art. 17.2, Civil Convention, supra note 35.
97. Art. 23.2, Civil Convention, supra note 35.
98. Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 83. But see notes 44-48, supra (citing, inter
alia, American Convention on Human Rights, Art. IV., 1. which provides in pertinent part,
"Every person has the right to have his life respected. This shall be protected by law and, in
general, from the moment of conception.").
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U.S. would be foreclosed from independently imposing any restraints on
the right unless it demonstrated a compelling interest in doing so, and
was unable to further that interest by less restrictive means. Restraints
imposed under local law that did not satisfy this standard99 would ad-
versely affect the program's evaluation leading to reduced funding, con-
tingent funding or actual termination.
U.S. supported family planning programs would accordingly stress
that enhancement of the recipient's own decision-making capacity is the
first priority of family planning efforts. This requires that the couple be
fully informed as to the options available and their possible conse-
quences. The state's interest in population control is "trumped" by the
individual's right'00 and cannot justify its abrogation. Under a rights anal-
ysis, accordingly, population control policies that infringe on the individ-
ual's right to reproductive choice could lead to the loss of U.S. support for
programs implementing such policies. This does not mean that local pro-
grams incorporating population goals would necessarily run afoul of the
U.S. constitution. But unless public welfare concerns were "compelling,"
and could not be advanced by any "less restrictive means," U.S. funding
could be withdrawn. 1° 1
In addition to program evaluation, recognition of reproductive choice
as a right makes it more secure. If abortion is merely considered a policy
preference, for example, women's access to abortion is likely to be contin-
gent upon the changing priorities of external, usually male, decision-mak-
ers. Moreover, any derogation of reproductive choice legitimizes encroach-
ment of the right. Abortion-based restrictions are likely to undermine a
far broader range of family planning programs, just as the Helms Amend-
ment, although limited in terms of its initial impact, provided a basis for
the MCP's later sweeping attack against family planning. The Helms
Amendment should be repealed more because of its role in the erosion of
reproductive choice than because of its direct, relatively insignificant,
consequences. As Hartmann has observed, banning abortion is merely the
first step in the political agenda of the anti-family planning forces. 2
b. Whose right is it?
Where the couple disagrees on reproductive choice, the final decision
99. See generally, And the Poor Get Sterilized, THE NATION, June 30, 1984, at 798-99;
Bishop, Officials Debate Asylum for Chinese Fleeing Abortion Policy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
1989, at A13, col.1.
100. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
101. But cf. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d, at 437 (declining to "unnecessarily attempt[] to
elaborate the abstract differences between a fundamental right to abortion . . . a 'limited
fundamental constitutional right' . . . or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, which we believe it to be.") If abortion were held to involve merely a liberty interest,
the 'strict scrutiny test' set forth in the text would not apply.
102. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 244, 293. See generally Cook & Maine,
Spousal Veto Over Family Planning Services, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 339 (1987).
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must be the woman's since she is the one who will be pregnant and give
birth.'0 3 As Hartmann has noted, however, this is rarely feasible in the
Third World. The husband customarily controls the family's money and
land, expects sons from his wife, and is likely to regard with hostility any
innovation which reduces her dependence on him, particularly if it in-
creases her sexual freedom - and his anxiety about her fidelity."0 4 Plan-
ning services that exclude the husband in order to encourage the wife's
independence simply leave the wife in the untenable position of convinc-
ing a suspicious husband of the benefits of birth control. Without sup-
port, from the program or her community, her efforts are likely to be
futile and she may even risk physical abuse.
Some family planning services have attempted to involve the hus-
band in the process and to educate him as to the benefits of contracep-
tion, for the family as well as the wife.10 5 Although reproductive choice is
the woman's right in theory, in practice she may not be able to exercise it
without the consent and cooperation of her spouse. There is no technical
violation of a rights' approach, however, as long as there is no legal im-
pediment to the woman's exercise of the right. While it is unlikely that
the husband's domination will be significantly undermined merely by ex-
plaining to the couple that the right is generally the woman's, such expla-
nations may contribute to a changing perception of women's roles. Recog-
nizing that the right is ultimately the woman's has other practical
consequences; among them that no family planning program could re-
quire her to obtain spousal consent for contraception, including abortion,
even if social pressure compels her to do so.
2. Reproductive choice as a prerequisite for equality and autonomy
It has been suggested that control over the body should be consid-
ered the first form of autonomy.1 0 6 Feminists have argued, moreover, that
in the reproductive context it is the necessary condition of all later forms.
As Elizabeth Moen notes, "[t]he control of fertility by women as individ-
uals is necessary for full and equal opportunity in society."'01 7 The critical
103. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) ("Clearly since the
State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot dele-
gate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that
same period."). Dixon-Mueller, U.S. International Population Policy and 'The Woman
Question,' 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 143, 167 (1987); see generally Symposium: Women
and International Human Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1981); Higgins, Conceptual Thinking
About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11 (1978). But cf.
Where Abortion Laws Stand Now, State by State, supra note 69 (Montana, Utah and Flor-
ida have laws requiring that husbands be notified).
104. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 48.
105. See, e.g., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT: IPPF/WHR 27-28 (describing contraception edu-
cation program for Mexican men in "security institutions").
106. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977).
107. Moen, Women's Rights and Reproductive Freedom, 3 HuM. RTS. Q. 53, 59 (1981);
accord L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN
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question here is whether reproductive choice empowers women where po-
litical, economic and social constraints not only remain in place, but are
so pervasive as to call into question even the possibility of "choice."' 0 s
Even under such circumstances, a modicum of reproductive choice
offers women the possibility of incremental change in their lives. Control
over reproductive capacity is essential, if not sufficient, not only for
equality but for any kind of transformation in women's role in the family
and society in the Third World.'0 9 The experience of controlling her own
fertility is directly and concretely empowering. Only if she can be free of
pregnancy, nursing, and infant care long enough to regain her strength
and consider her own needs, can a woman begin to question the political
and social forces that circumscribe her life."
B. Social and Economic Rights
1. Health
The Economic Covenant assures the right to health: "The States par-
ties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health." ' The Women's Convention is more specific:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the field of health care in order to en-
sure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care
services, including those related to family planning . . . "States Par-
ties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women... (e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the infor-
mation, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights.""'
The availability of contraception can improve health in three impor-
AMERICA 394 (1976).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93, 104.
109. "The question of reproductive choice ultimately goes far beyond the bounds of
family planning programs, involving women's role in the family and society at large. Control
over reproduction is predicated on women having greater control over their economic and
social lives and sharing power equally with men." B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 34.
110. Indeed, it has been suggested that this is precisely why reproductive choice has
been so adamantly opposed by those embracing and incorporating patriarchal norms, in-
cluding the Catholic Church. See generally Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law
and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980). See also Benshoof, supra note 20.
111. Art. 12.1, Economic Convention, supra note 35.
112. Art. 16.1; accord Universal Declaration, Art. 19. See Fraser, Women and Interna-
tional Law, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 174 (1988) (noting that more reservations to the
Convention have been made on Art. 16 than on any other article and attributing this to
conflict between "strong cultural norms" and the article's mandate). See generally Byrnes,
supra note 35, at 51-56 (discussing problem of reservations to the Women's Convention).
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tant ways. First, it can decrease maternal mortality rates,' 3 because it
permits women to regain strength between pregnancies,"" to limit
pregnancies 1 '5 and to avoid particularly dangerous pregnancies." 6 Second,
it benefits infants, who have higher birth weights and receive better care
when there is longer spacing between children. As Dixon-Mueller has
pointed out, mortality rates for children between one and two years old
are as much as four times higher when there is another birth within eigh-
teen months. 1 7 Third, contraception prevents death from illegal abor-
tions. Illegal abortions in the Third World represent a leading cause of
death among women of childbearing age,"18 demonstrating the urgent
need for the repeal of the Helms Amendment and the MCP in order to
safeguard women's right to health." 9
The effect of family planning programs on health has not all been
positive, however."' Even where contraception is freely chosen, it may
have adverse effects on health. First, as our own experience has shown,
IUDs and birth control pills are not without significant health risks. Ab-
sent adequate education and support personnel, these risks are likely to
be compounded by ignorance as to proper use. Additional risks, including
abrupt termination of supplies, instruction, and follow-up care, may re-
sult from reliance on funding sources subject to political whim. As dis-
cussed above, family planning services require an ongoing commitment.
These ill-effects are not inevitable results of family planning. Rather,
they are problems resulting from poor administration or the inappropri-
ate priorities of such programs. Health problems are especially prevalent
in programs giving demographic goals precedence over individual rights,
for example. Thus, the "failures" of family planning, from a health per-
spective, strengthen arguments for both an adequate level of funding and
the need for an emphasis on the human rights consequences of the ser-
113. Mortality rates in excess of 500 per 100,000 live births are common in the Third
World, compared to five to 30 per 100,000 in the west. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 46;
see also Dixon-Mueller, supra note 103, at 115. See generally Cook, Reducing Maternal
Mortality: A Priority for Human Rights Law, in LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION 185
(1989).
114. See Cook & Dickens, International Developments in Abortion Laws: 1977-78,
AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1305, 1309 (1988) (noting that "epidemiological evidence shows that
sound child spacing assisted by availability of abortion contributed positively to reduction
of maternal . . . mortality.").
115. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 103, at 109.
116. Id. at 108.
117. Id. at 112-13. See also Cook & Dickens, supra note 114, at 1309.
118. Rosenfeld, Abortion: The Neglected Problem, 15 PEOPLE 4 (1988) (an estimated
30-40% of 500,000 pregnancy related deaths (150,000-200,000) are attributable to complica-
tions of illegal abortions; citing survey of 60 developing countries in late 1970's, estimating
70,000-100,000 maternal deaths annually from complications of abortion).
119. As many commentators have noted, women have abortions whether or not they are
legal. The difference is in the cost and the quality of care they receive. See, e.g., R. REPETTO,
supra note 5, at 50; B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 47; Rosenfeld, supra note 118.
120. For a detailed description of the ill-effects of contraception, and their abuses by
population planners in the Third World, see B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 176-207.
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vices provided.
2. Adequate Standard of Living
In addition to health factors, the Economic Covenant assures a right
to an adequate standard of living: "The States Parties to the present Cov-
enant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing
.... ,,121 The Economic Covenant further recognizes "the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger." '122 While these provisions have
been used to support arguments for the redistribution of resources,12 it is
equally clear that under the Economic Covenant the economic conse-
quences of a growing population1 24 must be taken into account.'2 5
As Camp has pointed out, the harm to family planning caused by the
MCP was not so much loss of support, but the loss of support by specific
countries that had spiraling populations. By rescinding those policies, ac-
cordingly, the U.S. would be able to reestablish family planning efforts in
countries such as India, which "adds more people to the world population
than any other country . . . more than all of sub-Saharan Africa
combined."'
12 6
While national fertility levels reflect aggregate decision-making about
population, individual reproductive choice has been shown to be a signifi-
cant factor. Decisions about reproduction are a function of more than the
availability of contraception or abortion, of course,'2 7 but the unavailabil-
ity of birth control is often pre-emptive. Control over reproduction is one
of the major determinants of the individual family's standard of living.
Such control, accordingly, is necessary if the family is to provide a "life
with dignity" for its members. 2
CONCLUSION
By renouncing the MCP and repealing the Helms amendment, and
121. Art. 11.1, Economic Convention, supra note 35.
122. Art. 11.2, Economic Convention, supra note 35.
123. See generally Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in ETHICS, Ec-
ONOMICS AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV (J. Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1982).
124. While global population is steadily growing, the rate of population growth is no
longer increasing. Repetto, Population, Resource Pressures and Poverty, 131, 133, in THE
GLOBAL POSSIBLE: RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW CENTURY (R. Repetto ed. 1985).
This has not reassured proponents of the "population explosion" view. See, e.g., Gore, An
Ecological Kristallnacht. Listen, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, Op-Ed, § 4, at E27, col.1.
125. For an analysis of the relation between redistribution of resources and population
control, see Ratcliffe, supra note 4.
126. Camp, supra note 16, at 45.
127. See Ratcliffe, supra note 4, at 279.
128. Dominguez, Assessing Human Rights Conditions, in ENFORCING GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (1979); see generally Nielsen, On the Need to Politicize Political Morality: World
Hunger and Moral Obligation, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV (J. Chap-
man & J. Pennock eds. 1982).
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applying constitutional and internationally recognized human rights stan-
dards to its international family planning policy, the U.S. could substan-
tially further international human rights. It would at least increase the
possibility of reproductive choice for women currently without options.
While such choice cannot assure equality, it is a prerequisite. Thus, revi-
sion of our family planning policy would potentially empower women. It
would promote the right to health recognized under the Economic Cove-
nant, especially, but not exclusively, for women and children. It would
enable millions to take a critical first step toward an "adequate standard
of living." Finally, by demonstrating respect for the concerns and priori-
ties of the rest of the world, particularly Third World women, adoption of
the family planning policy considered above would represent a fundamen-
tal and long overdue shift in the U.S. approach to international human
rights.
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